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Abstract—Controller area networks (CANs) are a broadcast
protocol for real-time communication of critical vehicle subsys-
tems. Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of passenger
vehicles hold secret their mappings of CAN data to vehicle
signals, and these definitions vary per make, model, and year.
Without these mappings, the wealth of real-time vehicle infor-
mation hidden in the CAN packets is uninterpretable—severely
impeding vehicle-related research including CAN cybersecurity
and privacy studies, after-market tuning, efficiency and perfor-
mance monitoring, and fault diagnosis to name a few.
Guided by the four-part CAN signal definition, we present
CAN-D (CAN Decoder), a modular, four-step pipeline for identi-
fying each signal’s boundaries (start bit and length), endianness
(byte ordering), signedness (bit-to-integer encoding), and by
leveraging diagnostic standards, augmenting a subset of the
extracted signals with meaningful, physical interpretation. En
route to CAN-D, we provide a comprehensive review of the CAN
signal reverse engineering research. All previous methods ignore
endianness and signedness, rendering them simply incapable of
decoding many standard CAN signal definitions. Incorporating
endianness grows the search space from 128 to 4.72E21 signal
tokenizations, and introduces a web of changing dependencies. In
response, we formulate, formally analyze, and provide an efficient
solution to an optimization problem, allowing identification of
the optimal set of signal boundaries and byte orderings. In
addition, we provide two novel, state-of-the-art signal boundary
classifiers (both superior to previous approaches in precision and
recall in three different test scenarios) and the first signedness
classification algorithm, which exhibits > 97% F-score. Overall,
CAN-D is the only solution with the potential to extract any
CAN signal and is the state of the art. In evaluation on ten
vehicles of different makes, CAN-D’s average `1 error is 5 times
better (81% less) than all preceding methods, and exhibits lower
average error even when considering only signals that meet
prior methods’ assumptions. Finally, CAN-D is implemented in
lightweight hardware allowing OBD-II plugin for real-time in-
vehicle CAN decoding.
Index Terms—Controller Area Network (CAN); Reverse En-
gineering; Machine Learning; Security; Privacy; Technology;
I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
Modern automobiles rely on communication of several
electronic control units (ECUs) (internal computers) over a
few controller area networks (CANs) and adhere to a fixed
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CAN protocol. Sensors readings, such as accelerator pedal
angle, brakes, fuel injection timing, wheel speeds, as well
as less important readings, such as radio settings, are all
communicated as signals encoded in the CAN messages. For
passenger vehicles, the encodings of these signals into CAN
messages are proprietary—one can monitor (and send) CAN
messages, but generally cannot understand their meaning.
Further, these encodings vary per make, model, year, even
trim, and in practice, reverse engineering of signals is currently
a tedious, per-vehicle effort. As CAN data is sent at a rapid rate
and carries a wide variety of real-time vehicle information, a
vehicle-agnostic solution for decoding CAN signals promises a
vast resource of streaming, up-to-date information for analytics
and technology development on any vehicle.
Each CAN message has up to 64 bits of data containing
(usually) multiple signals (Figs. 2 & 3). Automotive CAN
signals are characterized by four defining properties (discussed
in detail in Sec. I): (1) signal boundaries (start/end bit), (2)
endianness (byte order), (3) signedness (bit-to-integer encod-
ing), and (4) physical interpretation. The signal definitions for
each message (a message definition) are defined in vehicle’s
CAN database file (the industry standard is Vector’s .dbc
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Fig. 1: CAN-Decoder (CAN-D) Pipeline: A four step modular
pipeline that take a CAN log (capture of CAN data) as input,
and outputs a DBC with signal definitions, thus providing vehicle-
agnostic CAN signal reverse engineering. Italicized processes out-
lined in dotted red lines indicate modular pieces that can be any
algorithm that satisfies the input/output requirements. Descriptions of
our choices for these pieces are provided. Greek letters α− δ denote
tuning parameters (possibly) needed for steps 1− 4 respectively.
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TABLE I: Automotive CAN signal reverse engineering algorithms for
each of the four signal properties. CAN-D is the only comprehensive
algorithm, determining all four properties.
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Jaynes et al. (2016) [1] # # # G#
Markowitz & Wool (2017) [2]  # # #
Huybrechts et al. (2017) [3] G# # # G#
Nolan et al.’s TANG (2018) [4]  # # #
Marchetti & Stabili’s READ (2018) [5]  # # #
Verma et al.’s ACTT (2018) [6]  # #  
Pese´ et al. LibreCAN (2019) [7]  # #  
Young et al. (2020) [8] # # # G#
CAN-D     
or “DBC” file format). We use this industry-standard, four-
part signal definition to frame our understanding of previous
works and guide our approach. The goal is a vehicle-agnostic
CAN decoder—to discover these four defining properties for
each signal from CAN data from any vehicle, i.e., to reverse
engineering the signal definitions in the vehicle’s DBC.
Recently, the research community has focused on reverse
engineering signals from automotive CAN data. This research
is summarized in Related Works (Sec. II), and Table I catalogs
each work’s efforts in identifying the four defining signal
characteristics. Notably, all current approaches focus only on
identifying signal boundaries (1) and/or matching signals to
observable sensor data (4), and ignore endianness (2) and
signedness (3), meaning they are unable to decode many
standard CAN signals.
All previous works have developed and tested algorithms
on limited CAN data, often from a single make. Targeting
a vehicle-agnostic solution, we compile a much more varied
collection of labeled CAN data from ten different makes
(see Sec. IV). Equipped with this robust, labeled dataset for
development and testing, we pursue the first comprehensive
and most accurate signal reverse-engineering pipeline (see
Fig. 1). Before describing our contributions, we introduce
necessary background information.
Fig. 2: CAN 2.0 frame depicted [9]: Arbitration ID indexes the frame;
Data Field carries message content up to 64 bits.
A. CAN Fundamentals & Notation
CAN 2.0 defines the physical and data link layers (OSI
layers one and two) of a broadcast protocol [10]. In particular
it specifies the standardized CAN frame (or packet) format
represented in Fig. 2. For semantic understanding of a CAN
frame, only two components of the frame are necessary:
• Arbitration ID - an 11-bit header used to identify the
frame, and for arbitration (determining frame priority when
multiple ECUs concurrently transmit);
• Data Field/Message - up to 64 bits of content.
Each ID’s data field is comprised of signals of varying lengths
and encoding schemes packed into the 64 bits (see Fig. 3, left).
A .dbc file provides the definitions of signals in the data field
for each ID, thus defining each CAN Message.
CAN frames with the same ID (message header/index) are
usually sent with a fixed frequency to communicate updated
signal values, although some are aperiodic (triggered by an
event). For example, ID 0x3A2 occurs every 0.1s, ID 0x45D
occurs every 0.25s, etc. We partition CAN logs into ID traces,
the time series of 64-bit messages for each ID. An ID trace
is denoted [B0(t) . . . , B63(t)]t, a time-varying binary vector
of length 64. Note that without loss of generality, we assume
each message is 64 bits by padding with 0 bits if necessary.
1) Byte Order (Endianness) & Bit Order: The significance
of a signal’s bits within a byte (contiguous 8-bit subsequences)
decreases from left to right, i.e., the first bit transmitted is
the most significant bit (MSB), and the last (eighth) bit,
the least significant bit (LSB). This is defined in the CAN
Specification [10, 11] but has been misrepresented [7] and
misunderstood [4, 6] by previous signal reverse engineering
works. The confusion results from use of both big endian
and little endian byte orderings in CAN messages. Big endian
(B.E.) indicates that the significance of bytes decreases from
left to right, whereas little endian (L.E.) reverses the order
of the bytes (but maintains the order of the bits in each byte)
[12]. We list the bit orderings for a 64-bit data field under both
endiannesses with parenthesis demarcating the bytes [11]:
B.E.: (B0 , . . . , B7 ), (B8 . . . , B15), . . . , (B56, . . . , B63)
L.E.: (B56, . . . , B63), (B48, . . . , B55), . . . , (B0 , . . . , B7 )
(1)
See Examples 1 & 2 for how this affects signal definitions.
2) CAN Signals: The specifications for decoding each ID’s
message into a set of signal values is defined by the OEM and
held secret, usually stored in a DBC. Signal definitions consist
of several properties (see Fig. 3, right) that detail how to:
tokenize (demarcate the signal’s sequence of bits):
• Start bit and length give signal position in the data field;
• Byte ordering: If the signal crosses a byte boundary, little
endian signals reverse the order of the bytes while big
endian signals retain byte order (see Eq. 1);
translate (convert a sequence of bits to integers):
• Signedness: Unsigned, the usual base 2 encoding, vs.
signed, two’s complement encoding [15];
Fig. 3: DBCs visualized through DBC Editor GUIs. Left: A signal
layout plot visually represents a CAN Message tokenization, depict-
ing an ID’s 64-bit data field as an 8 × 8 array containing CAN
Signal(s). Each signal’s constituent bits are shown in a unique color
and unused bits are shown in white. (CANdb++ Database Editor)
[13] Right: Signal definition of first 16-bit yellow signal, defined
by properties: start bit, length, signedness, endianness, scaling factor,
offset, unit. (NI-XNET Database Editor) [14]
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and interpret (linearly scale raw translated signal values to
physically meaningful and interpretable information):
• Label and unit, giving the physical meaning of the signal
and it’s units (e.g., speed in MPH);
• Scale and offset, which provide the linear mapping of the
signal’s tokenized values to the appropriate units.
It is implicit in the DBC signal definition that (non-constant)
signals are contiguous sequences of non-constant bits.
Example 1. Consider in Fig. 3 the first two-byte yellow signal.
To tokenize the signal, or know it’s sequence (implying order)
of bits, we must know endianness. If bytes 1 & 2 are big
endian, we obtain MSB-to-LSB bit indices, I = (0, . . . , 15)
whereas if they are little endian, the bytes are swapped, obtain-
ing MSB-to-LSB bit indices I = (8, . . . , 15, 0, . . . , 7), notably
with B15 → B0. Next, the signal’s signedness furnishes the
translation of that bit sequence to an integer. The information
needed for interpretation are the label and unit of the signal
(in this case Engine RPM) and the linear transformation
to convert the translated values (a two-byte signal can take
216 − 1 = 65, 535 values) to the appropriate physical value
(e.g., in the range 0− 10, 000 RPM).
Fig. 6 illustrates timeseries of CAN data that have been
decoded using both correct and incorrect signal definitions.
Fig. 6 (a) plots green and blue CAN signals tokenized with
correct (middle) vs. incorrect (right) signedness, and Fig. 6
(b) plots CAN signals tokenized with correct (top) vs. incor-
rect endianness (bottom, in particular, the navy signal). The
clear discontinuities in these mis-tokenized and mis-translated
signals exhibit the importance of knowing the endianness and
signedness for extracting meaningful time series.
3) On-board Diagnostics: In the U.S., all vehicles sold after
1996 include an on-board diagnostic (OBD-II) port, which
generally allows for open access to automotive CANs, and
emissions-producing vehicles sold after 2007 also include
a mandatory, standard interrogation schema for extracting
diagnostic data using the J1979 standard [16]. This On-board
Diagnostic service (OBD) is an application layer protocol in
which one can query diagnostic data from the vehicle by
sending a CAN frame. A CAN response is broadcasted with
the requested vehicular state information. There are a standard
set of queries possibly available via this call-response protocol
(e.g, accelerator pedal position, intake air temperature, vehicle
speed) along with unit conversions, each corresponding to a
unique diagnostic OBD-II PID (DID) [17]. Specific examples
of how to perform the call and response are available, e.g.,
[7, 18]. Previous CAN decoding works have iteratively sent
DID requests and parsed the responses from CAN traffic to
capture valuable, real-time, labeled vehicle data without using
external sensors [3, 6, 7]. We denote these time series of
diagnostic responses, or DID traces, D(t). Inherent limitations
exist—the set of available DIDs varies per make, and electric
vehicles need not conform to this standard [6, 7].
B. Problem, Assumptions, & Challenges
1) Problem: The goal is to to recreate the .dbc file’s signal
definitions, (discover the four properties for each signal) for
any vehicle from a sufficient capture of a vehicle’s CAN data.
2) Assumptions: We make five fundamental assumptions:
(A0): Observed constant bits are unused.
(A1): Both big and little endian byte orders are possible.
(A1.a): Both endiannesses can occur in a single ID. We
have not observed this, but it is permitted by protocol and
DBC syntax. DBC editor GUIs allow per-signal endianness
specification with a checkbox or pull down (e.g. Fig. 3, Right),
indicating that both byte orderings can co-occur in a message.
(A1.b): A single byte cannot have bits used in a little endian
signal while also containing bits used in a big endian signal;
else, the byte orders indicated by the signals are contradictory.
(A2): Signed signals are possible and are encoded using a 2’s
complement encoding.
3) Challenges: In practice, it is difficult to exercise the
MSBs of a signal, resulting in errors in determining signal
boundaries (a Step 1 challenge). For example, consider the
two-byte (16-bit) Engine RPM signal in Example 1 with
translated values between 0−10, 000. As 5,000 RPMs is rarely
reached, the MSB of this signal is likely to be observed as
a constant 0 bit, causing the signal start bit to be mislabeled.
Though this is easily surmountable for RPMs (e.g., rev engine
in neutral during collection), it is far more difficult to solve
this for latent sensors, e.g, engine temperature.
Secondly, since continuous signals are sampled periodically,
those with high resolution signals (e.g., a two-byte signal has
216 > 65, 000 values) have LSBs flipping seemingly randomly
(a Step 1 challenge). Our results indicate that the TANG
algorithm [4] suffers from the overly strict assumption that flip
frequencies are monotonically decreasing with bit significance.
Thirdly, considering both big and little endianness greatly
enhances complexity of the problem, as bits on the byte
boundaries have unknown neighbors (albeit in a fixed set of
possibilities); e.g., simply comparing the bit flip probabilities
of neighboring bits now requires custom rules for incorpo-
rating all possible neighbors according to (A1), (A1.a) but
remove impossibilities imposed by (A1.b) (a Step 2 challenge).
See details in Sec. III-B.
Fourthly, considering both signed and unsigned encodings
adds another hurdle; in particular, the order of bit representa-
tions mod 2n is the same for both signed and unsigned, half
the bit strings represent different integers (a Step 3 challenge).
Finally, many CAN signals communicate sensor values that
are hard to measure with external sensors; hence, identifying
the physical meaning, unit and linear mapping (scale and
offset) can be difficult (a Step 4 challenge).
C. Contributions
We make six contributions to the area of automotive CAN
signal reverse engineering:
C1. Comprehensive signal reverse engineering pipeline:
Our primary contribution is a modular, four-part pipeline,
depicted in Fig. 1, for learning all four components of a CAN
signal definition, respectively. The pipeline is modular in that:
Step 1 can accommodate any signal boundary classification
method; Step 3 can accommodate any signedness classifica-
tion algorithm; and Step 4 can accommodate any signal-to-
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timeseries matching algorithm for physical interpretation. In-
stantiating our pipeline with our signal-boundary classification
heuristic and (separately) our trained machine learning classi-
fier for Step 1 and the diagnostic sensor matching of Verma
et al. [6] for Step 4, we present a quantitative comparative
evaluation of our signal reverse engineering pipeline versus
previous methods. We demonstrate that CAN-D exhibits less
than a fifth average error of all previous methods (Sec. V-B
& Table VI, Bottom), and qualitatively illustrate the pitfalls
and limitations of previous methods (Sec. V-C & Fig. 6) that
our four-step pipeline circumvents. Overall, CAN-D is the first
CAN signal reverse engineering effort that can accommodate
all signals as defined in automotive DBC files, and is by far
more accurate than any previous effort. Further, it provides a
framework for future research developments to improve and
plug in advancements to each step.
C2. Introduction of two state-of-the-art signal boundary
classification algorithms and comparative study of previ-
ous algorithms: We develop two signal boundary classifiers,
a supervised machine learning model and an unsupervised
heuristic (Sec. III-A). We implement the previous state-of-
the-art classification methods and provide the first quantitative
comparison of all methods (Sec. V-A & Table VI, Top) on
a more comprehensive and robust data set than any previous
work. We demonstrate that our algorithms are significantly
more accurate than previous methods, superior in both recall
and precision in three testing scenarios.
C3. Endianness optimization formulation and solution:
All previous works are based on an assumption of big en-
dian byte ordering (to perform tokenization and/or signal-
to-timeseries matching) and there is no simple remediation
for adapting the previous algorithms to perform correctly
in the presence of both big and little (reverse byte order)
endian signals. The second step of our pipeline presents a
novel procedure that has been crafted to use the predictions
from any signal-boundary classification algorithm from Step
1 as input and determine the optimal set of endiannesses
and signal boundaries from all possible tokenizations (Sec.
III-B). We formulate an objective function to be optimized
and provide a formal mathematical proof for reducing the
search space to a very tractable grid search algorithm for
optimization. Overall, this insight allows all signal-boundary
classification algorithms to be leveraged for extracting both
little and big endian signals—which has thus far been ignored
and/or insurmountable.
C4. Signedness classification: We provide the first algo-
rithm for determining signal signedness (bit-to-integer encod-
ing) (Sec. III-C), allowing translation of signals to time series.
Testing shows this simple heuristic achieves > 97% F-Score.
C5. Prototype OBD-II plugin for in-situ or offline use:
The pipeline can be run offline for post-drive analysis or during
driving e.g., to feed online analytics such as a CAN IDS with
translated CAN data. We discuss our design and implementa-
tion of a lightweight on-board diagnostic (OBD-II) port plugin
device (Sec. VI & Fig. 7) for use in any vehicle where a
CAN is accessible via the OBD-II port (most vehicles). In a
signal learning phase, the device automatically logs CAN data
while periodically querying supported DIDs, and then runs
the algorithmic pipeline to learn signal definitions and write
a DBC. This allows the real-time decoding of CAN signals
on future drives, e.g., to feed a novel analytic technology
leveraging the vehicle’s signals online, or offline uses, e.g.,
to analyze CAN captures in post-collection analysis. This
prototype bridges the gap between the algorithmic research
in the literature and actual online use with any vehicle.
C6. Survey: We provide the first comprehensive survey of
works on reverse engineering CAN signals (Sec. II & Table
I), providing the progression of the field and documenting the
benefits and limitations of each.
D. Impact
Unveiling CAN signals will provide real-time measurements
of vehicle subsystems, a rich stream of data that promises
to fuel many vehicle technologies and put development and
analytics in the hands of the consumers (in addition to OEMs).
Multiple research works have, through direct and even
remote access to CANs, managed to manipulate a few manu-
ally reverse engineered signals, manifesting in life-threatening
effects—most notably, the remote Jeep hack of Miller &
Valasek [19–22]. These works demonstrate that CAN reverse
engineering is possible on a per-vehicle basis with ample effort
and expertise, and will not inhibit the determined adversary.
The obscurity of CAN data does, however, hinder vulnerability
analysis research necessary for hardening vehicle systems,
and automated CAN reverse engineering will greatly expedite
vehicle vulnerability research.
In parallel, CAN defensive security research is growing
quickly; we found 15 surveys of the area since 2017, e.g.,
[23, 24], with over 60 works on CAN intrusion detection
between 2016-19. Yet these works are impeded by obfuscated
CAN data, forced to either use side-channel methods that
ignore message contents [25–27], use black-box methods
ignorant of message meanings [28–30], or either arduously
reverse engineer a few signals for a specific vehicle [31]
or rely on an OEM for signal definitions [32], which keeps
CAN security in the OEM’s hands and develops per-make (not
vehicle-agnostic) capabilities. A vehicle-agnostic CAN signal
reverse engineering tool promises to remove these limitations
and provide rich, online, time-series data for advancements
in detection and other security technologies. Further, this
CAN signal decoding will promote universally applicable
technologies to address cars currently on the road, and remove
reliance on the vehicle OEMs for CAN security.
Another emerging subfield of research is driver fingerprint-
ing [33, 34], developing methods to identify drivers based
on their driving characteristics, such as braking, accelerating,
and steering. Access to the decoded CAN data will allow
these works to be ported to plugin technologies for nearly
any vehicle, impacting at a minimum driver privacy and
insurance strategies, and potentially forensic (e.g., criminal)
investigations, and vehicle security to name a few.
In addition, access to CAN signals will potentially as-
sist development of after-market tuning tools for enhanced
efficiency and performance, fuel efficiency monitoring and
guidance, fleet management, vehicle fault diagnosis, forensics
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technologies, and after-market vehicle-to-vehicle capabilities.
As a final example, we note that after-market technologies to
provide autonomous driving capabilities to current vehicles
are appearing; in particular, Open Pilot (https://comma.ai/)
provides latitudinal and longitudinal control for many vehi-
cles on the road using a few, presumably manually reverse-
engineered CAN signals. Automated, accurate, and universally
applicable CAN de-obfuscation will promote and expedite
such vehicle technologies, especially, after-market solutions
for many vehicles currently in use.
II. CAN SIGNAL REVERSE ENGINEERING SURVEY
This section provides the first comprehensive survey of
methods for decoding automotive CAN data into constituent
signals. We seek to show the progression of the literature, and
we provide more detailed descriptions of the methods that
we evaluate in Sec. V with authors/methods in bold. Table
I gives a quick reference for the signal reverse engineering
contributions of each work.
Early work of Jaynes et al. [1] (2016) explored supervised
learning to identify CAN messages that control body related
events, but the approach was unaware that data fields are
comprised of multiple disparate signals. Thus, this method
simply labels entire messages with a general physical meaning.
Markowitz & Wool [2] (2017) focuses on CAN
anomaly/intrusion detection but pursues signal extraction as a
preprocessing step. They were the first to introduce the basic
assumption each arbitration ID’s data field is “a concatenation
of positional [signals]”. Implicitly, Markowitz & Wool’s algo-
rithm assumes only big endian and unsigned signals; hence,
their algorithm need only identify the start bit and length of
a signal. The algorithm considers all 2080 possible signals
(indexed by start bit and length) in an ID’s 64-bit data field,
and based on the cardinality of each candidate signal’s range,
the count of observed distinct values. It then categorizes the
signal as constant, categorical (taking on only a few values),
or continuous (values of a discretely sampled continuous
variable) based on the range and assigns a score. Finally, the
method identifies a non-overlapping partition of the 64 bits
based on category and a optimization of the signals’ scores.
Huybrechts et al. [3] (2017) is the first work to leverage
DIDs to annotate CAN data and identify signals. Their al-
gorithm converts bytes/byte-pairs in CAN messages to in-
tegers and identifies those that are similar to the concur-
rently collected DID responses, but operates under the self-
acknowledged false assumption that CAN signals are limited
to only one or two-byte signals. No linear transformation of
extracted signals to the DID sensor values is given.
The next three works, Nolan et al.’s TANG algorithm [4],
Verma et. al.’s ACTT [6], and Marchetti & Stabili’s READ [5]
appear to have occurred independently and concurrently, and
we present them chronologically by publication date.
Nolan et al. [4] (2018) focus solely on extracting continuous
signals by considering the “transition aggregated n-grams”
(TANG). Given an ID trace [B0(t), . . . , B63(t)]t Nolan et
al. define the TANG vector as (T0, . . . , T63) with Ti =∑
tBi(tj)
⊕
Bi(tj+1), where
⊕
denotes XOR. Note, this is
simply a computationally efficient way to obtain the bit flip
count; hence, if an n-bit signal’s subsequent values change by
unit increments, the LSB will exhibit Ti = 2n + 1, and each
next significant bit will have TANG values decreasing by a
factor of 2. The algorithm for identifying continuous signal
boundaries is, roughly speaking: compute the TANG vector
from an ID trace, identify the bit with maximal TANG value
as a signal’s LSB, and walk left (resp. right for reverse bit
order) absorbing bits into the signal until the TANG value
increases. Nolan et al. consider both forward and reverse bit
orderings to attempt to take little and big endian encodings
into account. However, since endianness refers to byte (not
bit) order, this method cannot accommodate true little endian
signals, and in fact violates the fixed bit order defined by the
standard. Overall, this method assumes big endian, unsigned,
and continuous signals.
Marchetti & Stabili [5] (2018) propose the READ (Re-
verse Engineering of Automotive Dataframes) algorithm to
extract signals using heuristics based on a 64-length vec-
tor giving each bit’s observed flip probability, [P (Bi(tj) 6=
Bi(tj+1))]
63
i=0. First, signal boundaries are identified using
mi := dlog10(P (Bi(tj) 6= Bi(tj+1)))e the ceiling function of
the log probabilities. READ follows intuition similar to TANG:
for continuous signals, a LSB flips much more often than an
adjacent signal’s MSB. Hence, READ places signal boundaries
between bits i and i+ 1 iff mi > mi+1, or equivalently if the
the bit flip probabilities cross a factor of 10 (e.g., from above
.01 to below). Unlike TANG, READ does not claim to assume
only continuous signals, and it in fact builds on Markowitz &
Wool’s signal categorization efforts. It considers a trichotomy
of signal categories —counters (increments by 1 with each
message), checksums (hashes for checking if messages are
properly transmitted), and a catch-all bin, “physical” signals
—categorizing the extracted signals with further heuristics
relating to bit flips. Ultimately, READ partitions an ID’s 64-bit
data frame into signals with categorical labels. The algorithm
ignores little endian and signed encoding possibilities and can-
not be easily amended to accommodate little endian signals.
Marchetti & Stabili’s evaluations with real and synthetic CAN
data comparing with Markowitz & Wool’s method reveal that
READ is far more accurate at finding signal boundaries.
Verma et al.’s ACTT [6] (2018), takes a fundamentally
different approach than all previous works. Instead of partial
tokenization and translation, specifically, learning to identify
signal boundaries under limiting assumptions (e.g., assuming
big endian and unsigned encodings) in an unsupervised fash-
ion, ACTT simultaneously tokenizes, translates, and interprets
CAN signals. The method automatically identifies which DIDs
(See Sec. I-A3) respond on the particular vehicle, and then
collects ambient CAN data during driving while periodically
querying DIDs. These diagnostic responses provide labeled
time-series, DID Traces, alongside the CAN data, setting up a
supervised decoding algorithm. For a given ID trace, the con-
stant bits are labeled, and all possible signals (start bit, length)
from the remaining non-constant bits are considered. For each
possible signal and for each DID trace, linear regression is
performed, and a score of linear fit is assigned. A scheduling
algorithm using dynamic programming then identifies a non-
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overlapping set of signals that maximize the fitness score. The
output is two-fold: (1) a list of constant signals, and (2) a
subset of signals equipped with linear mappings to a known
physical unit that matches a DID (start bit, length, scale,
offset, physical unit, sensor label). Like all previous works,
this method assumes unsigned encodings, and following Nolan
et al.’s TANG, mistakenly considers reverse bit order as little
endian (not byte order). Because this method relies on DID
matching to tokenize signals, only a small subset of signals
can be extracted, but all extracted signals are interpretable.
Pese´ et al. [7] (2019) present LibreCAN, a three phase
process. (Phase 0) LibreCAN makes tweaks to READ’s al-
gorithm for identifying signal boundaries and categorizing
extracted signals. Specifically, while READ identifies signal
boundaries by finding where adjacent bit flip probabilities de-
crease across a multiple of 10, LibreCAN identifies if adjacent
bit flip probabilities drop by a factor of Tp0,2, a tunable input
parameter. (Phase 1) LibreCAN next leverages ideas similar
to Verma et. al. [6], using cross correlation to match signals
to sensor readings from both DIDs and external sensors, then
using linear regression to learn the scale and offset. (Phase 2)
LibreCAN incorporates a novel, semi-automated method for
identifying body-related signals (e.g., door locks, windshield
wipers), by filtering IDs based on changes in data fields before
and after a user actuates the body-related feature. Pese´ et
al. note that little endian signals exist, but like all previous
methods, their algorithm assumes big endian byte order and
unsigned encodings, and does not have a natural extension to
accommodate little endian signals.
The most recent CAN reverse engineering work by Young
et. al. [8] (2020) uses a approach similar to LibreCAN (Phase
2) to match vehicular functions (based on a hand-labeled
timeseries) to CAN IDs based on a data-change identification
algorithm. They use a clustering algorithm to group related
IDs, labeling the remaining unknown IDs based on those
labeled in the matching step. However, similar to Jaynes
et. al., this work attempts to assign physical meaning to
an entire CAN ID rather than tokenize, translate, and then
identify (assign meaning) to constituent signals; thus, we do
not consider it (nor Jaynes et al.’s) to be a true signal reverse
engineering algorithm.
There are significant limitations of all previous works. Most
notably, all assume both big endian byte order and unsigned
encodings. While some may theoretically correctly identify
signed signals’ boundaries, this has not been mentioned or
tested. Worse, there is no natural extension to little endian
and/or signed signals. To identify signedness, an additional al-
gorithm is needed: a fairly straightforward binary classification
problem that is not difficult once well formed. Including endi-
anness, on the other hand, poses a far harder problem for two
reasons: (1) signal boundary algorithms depend on flip counts
of “neighboring” bits, but bit orderings change with endian-
ness, so neighboring bits cannot be determined; (2) without
considering both endiannesses, signal boundary identification
is computationally simple (the same binary classification is
independently repeated 64 times per ID), but considering all
byte orderings grows the search space combinatorially (264
boundary options × 28 byte orders > 4.72E21 tokenizations
per ID!) with a web of changing dependencies.
III. ALGORITHM
We present CAN-D (CAN-Decoder), a four-step modular
pipeline (depicted in Fig. 1) providing the first comprehensive
and vehicle-agnostic CAN signal reverse engineering solution.
We describe the needed inputs and outputs for the modular
components—a signal boundary classifier (Step 1, Sec. III-A),
a signedness classifier (Step 3, Sec. III-C), and a signal-
to-timeseries matcher (Step 4, Sec. III-D)—as well as our
novel endianness optimizer (Step 2, Sec. III-B), which we
consider to be the unique component providing the glue for
the interchangeable components.
A. Step 1: Signal Boundary Classification
Given an ID trace as input, a signal boundary classifier
makes 64 binary classification decisions—for each of the 64
bits, predict if it is the LSB of a signal (or not), effectively
deciding if a signal boundary or “cut” occurs between this
bit and the next. Almost all previous works have focused on
signal boundary classifiers that use hand-crafted heuristics that
leverage only one feature, the probability of each bit flipping.
In this section we pursue the same goal but use a wider set
of features. In addition to a novel, unsupervised heuristic we
leverage supervised machine learning (ML) and deliver two
superior signal boundary classifiers.
For the reverse engineering pipeline, outputs of the signal
boundary classifier in Step 1 are inputs to the endianness opti-
mizer in Step 2. While we frame signal boundary identification
as a set of binary classifications, the input for Step 2 of the
CAN-D pipeline is the estimated probability—in {0, 1} for
binary heuristics or in [0, 1] for ML—of a signal boundary for
each bit. Algorithms developed in previous works [2, 4–6] and
[7] (Phase 0) could be used as the Signal Boundary Classifier
for this step, all of which produce binary label outputs. Sec.
V presents results comparing our signal boundary classifiers
against the previous state-of-the-art.
1) Data & Notational Setup: Both unsupervised and su-
pervised predictions are based on statistics describing how a
particular bit and its neighboring bits flip. We use a ground-
truth DBC (see Sec. IV) to create a target vector, providing
a 0/1 label for each bit indicating if it is a signal’s LSB
(boundary). In order to deal with the issue that neighboring
bits at byte boundaries are conditioned on endianness, we
split little endian signals on byte boundaries for training
(the supervised models) and testing (all) models. In use,
the classifier (heuristic or ML) will be applied to ID traces
under both byte orderings (see Eq. 1), creating two sets of
predictions. Both sets of predictions are input to Step 2, which
determines the endianness of each byte.
Here we introduce two views of the data used for training
then scoring/tuning the ML in this section (both are also
used for testing all methods in Sec. V-A). For training, we
remove the constant bits (obvious boundaries) forming a
“condensed trace”. The motivation for this is threefold: (1)
Based on assumption (A0) (see Sec. I-B), observed constant
bits necessarily delimit signals, so a simple rule suffices to
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identify these obvious signal boundaries. (2) Our features
encode neighboring bits’ values and flips, so when nearby bits
are constant, features are either trivial or undefined. Removing
the non-constant bits prior to feature building yields a better
feature set. (3) Classes are highly biased towards the negative
class—most bits are not an LSB (not on a signal boundary).
By removing constant bits, we not only get better features,
but we artificially increase the number of non-obvious signal
boundaries and decrease class bias particularly for the non-
obvious examples for which a classifier is needed. Note this
is the “c” set described in Sec. V-A. Using this condensed
trace, we build a feature array with shape m non-constant bits
by nf features (features described below for each method).
Second, for tuning the ML classifiers in this section, we only
consider their performance on the non-obvious boundaries in
the original data—those boundaries not abutting constant bits
in the non-condensed ID traces. Note this set is the “f−” set
described in Sec. V-A. We tune our supervised model on this
set because we ultimately wish to apply the model to full 64-
bit traces and want to optimize performance for this situation.
2) Supervised Classification: To describe features concep-
tually, we use i ± 1 to denote bit i’s neighbors, notationally
neglecting the varying neighbors based on endianness (ref. Eq.
1) when it only presents unnecessary complications. For each
bit i, we generate a set of 15 features: The first five features
are “local” to bit i and its relationship to bit i + 1, which
we denote vidi ∈ R5. These features (listed in in Table II) are
estimated probabilities of a “bit flip” based on observations in
data over time. We denote the flip of bit i — alternating value
in subsequent messages Bi(tj) 6= Bi(tj+1)— as Fi.
TABLE II: Local bit-
flip features: Fi de-
notes a flip of bit i.
P (Fi)
P (Fi | Fi+1)
P (Fi+1 | Fi)
P (¬Fi | ¬Fi+1)
P (¬Fi+1 | ¬Fi)
The main intuition is that a signal’s
LSB generally alternates value much
more often than an adjacent signal’s
MSB; hence, the bit-flip features should
provide good indicators for boundaries.
Specifically, the first feature should
identify LSBs (P (Fi) ≈ 1) and MSBs
(P (Fi) ≈ 0). This is essentially the
feature on which previous works [4, 5, 7] base their heuristic.
The next four conditional bit flip features are expected to differ
significantly for adjacent bits contained in the same signal
versus those that are part of separate signals, as the former
are likely dependent while the latter are likely independent.
Next, we look to the neighboring bit on the right, bit i+ 1,
and add the five local features for this bit vidi+1 to our feature set
for bit i. Finally, we add five difference features δ(vidi+1, v
id
i ),
yielding a total 15-length feature vector for bit i.
Initially, we experimented with adding a wider variety of
features based on bit values, two-bit distributions, and entropy,
as well as more left/right neighboring features. However,
we found that these features did not improve classification
performance and in fact resulted in overfitting.
We tested the performance of several binary classifiers:
Naive Bayes, Logistic Regression, Support Vector Classifiers,
Decision Trees, Random Forests, K-Nearest Neighbors, Multi-
Layer Perceptrons and AdaBoost. After experimenting with
different weighting schemes to combat the bias class issue
as well as the fact that we only score the non-obvious
TABLE III: Aggregated Classification Metrics using
LOOCV by CAN log, only scoring non-obvious boundary
decisions (f− set). Top: Classifiers with default Scikit-learn
parameters. Bottom: The top performing Random Forest
Model, with optimal parameters chosen using a grid search.
Classifier F-Score Precision Recall
Naive Bayes 71.6 57.6 94.7
Logistic Regression 86.9 82.1 92.3
SVC Linear 85.5 78.6 93.8
SVC Poly 88.7 85.3 92.3
SVC RBF 89.0 84.8 93.8
SVC Sigmoid 46.4 42.3 51.4
KNN 88.1 81.3 96.2
MLP 88.4 82.5 95.2
AdaBoost 87.6 82.6 93.3
Decision Tree 78.5 67.8 93.3
Random Forest 90.2 85.4 95.7
Random Forest (Tuned)1 91.2 87.6 95.2
1 max_features=
√
nf, min_samples_Leaf=3,
n_estimators=200, max_depth=5
boundaries, we settle on a sample weighting scheme of non-
obvious-positive:negative:obvious-positive of 8:4:1. To test the
accuracy of the classifiers, we used Leave-One-Out-Cross-
Validation (LOOCV), holding out one CAN log per fold and
aggregating the results, and the f− set, only scoring non-
obvious boundaries. The results, shown in Table III, illustrate
that the Random Forest (RF) classifier performed the best.
Finding the optimal parameters for this top-performing model
using a grid search and LOOCV, the tuned model yields an
overall 88% Precision and 95% Recall for an F-Score of 91%.
We select this tuned RF model for our ML classifier.
Finally, as an input to Step 2, we output the classifier’s
predicted probability of a bit i being a signal’s LSB.
Fig. 4: Vis-
ualization of
Heuristic
Signal
Boundary
Classifier
(Alg. 1)
based on
conditional
bit flip
probabilities,
with
α1 = .01,
α2 = .5.
Algorithm 1: Heuristic Signal Boundary Classifier
Inputs: P (Fi+1 | Fi), P (Fi+2 | Fi+1), α1 , α2
if P (Fi+1 | Fi) < α1 or P (Fi+2 | Fi+1)− P (Fi+1 | Fi) > α2
then
return True
else
return False
3) Unsupervised Heuristic: As an alternative to ML, we
explore the feature set to develop a simple heuristic relating
to bit-flip probabilities. We find that the conditional bit-flip
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probability P (Fi+1|Fi) and the difference between successive
conditional bit flip probabilities P (Fi+2 | Fi+1) − P (Fi+1 |
Fi) are a better indicator of a signal ending at bit i than the
difference of unconditional bit flip probabilities P (Fi+1) −
P (Fi) used by most related works.
We develop a heuristic based on these findings, detailed in
Alg. 1 and visualized in Fig. 4. Based on observations of data,
we find that setting parameters α1 = .01, α2 = .5 splits the
feature space well, and yields a 90% F-Score and Precision
and 89% Recall (also on the f− set). Note that our heuristic
was developed and tuned based on a small preliminary dataset,
but we found it generalized well to all of our data.
The heuristic’s main advantage is that it requires no training
while achieving similar accuracy to the ML as shown in Sec.
V-A. Though simple, intuitive, and computationally efficient,
one drawback is that the outputs are binary labels, with no
way of determining probabilities properly in (0, 1), thereby
removing some of the flexibility offered by the following step.
B. Step 2: Endianness Optimization
Armed with the probability of a boundary or “cut” between
adjacent bits of a message, we construct an optimization prob-
lem to simultaneously determine the most likely packing of
signals into the 64-bit data-field and most likely endiannesses
of each of the eight bytes.
1) Valid Tokenizations: Denote a candidate signal I , the
list of bit indices ordered from MSB to LSB. Given a signal
I , let LSB(I) (or simply LSB if no ambiguity is present)
denote the least significant bit. We consider constant bits as
1-bit signals. Each ID has eight bytes indexed j = 0, . . . , 7
with byte j comprised of bits 8j, . . . , 8(j+1)−1. Let E(j) ∈
{B,L} denote that byte j is big, little endian, respectively.
Definition 1 (Valid Tokenizations). For a given ID trace,
define a valid tokenization, T , as a tuple of candidate signals
{Ik}k and endiannesses of each byte {E(j)}7j=0 such that:
(1)
⋃
Ik = {0, . . . , 63} (all 64 bits are used),
(2) Ik
⋂
Il = ∅ for all k 6= l (signals do not overlap),
(3) Assumption (A1.b), one endianness per byte, is satisfied
(implicit in the notation E(j)).
Example 2. For example, consider Fig. 5 (right), a signal plot
layout depicting a valid tokenization with one color per signal
(and constant bits in grey). The navy signal, a 10-bit little en-
dian signal starting at bit 0, is denoted I = (14, 15, 0, . . . , 7).
Since, B15 → B0, necessarily E(0) = E(1) = L.
Example 2 shows that if a signal I crosses a byte boundary,
the endianness of both bytes is determined by the order of
the indices according to Eq. 1. This leads to the following
definition and proposition, which will play an important role
in the computational tractability of our optimization problem.
Definition 2 (Byte Boundaries). For j = 0, . . . , 7 let v(j) ∈
{JB , JL, C} denote if byte boundary j is
• a cut (C): bit [8(j+ 1)−1] ends a signal or is constant,
• a big endian join (JB): [8(j + 1)− 1]→ 8(j + 1), or
• a little endian join (JL): [8(j + 1)− 1]→ 8(j − 1)
and V := {v ∈ {JB , JL, C}8 | v is valid byte boundary set}.
For bits not on a byte boundary (i /∈ S := {8j − 1}7j=0),
there are only two options: cut or join Bi → Bi+1, and both
are valid possibilities regardless of endianness.
Proposition 1. A valid tokenization T has v satisfying:
1) v(j) = JB =⇒ E(j) = E(j + 1) = B
2) v(j) = JL =⇒ E(j − 1) = E(j) = L
3) v(0) 6= JL
4) v(7) 6= JB
5) v(j) = JB =⇒ v(j + 1) 6= JL, v(j + 2) 6= JL
Proof. (1) and (2) follow directly from Eq. 1 (endianness
definition) and Assumption A1.b (one endianness per byte).
For (3) v(0) 6= JL else 0→ −8 /∈ [0, 63]. Similarly for (4).
For (5) if v(j) = JB and either v(j+1) = JL or v(j+2) =
JL, then (1) and (2) imply E(j + 1) is both big and little
endian, a violation of Assumption A1.b.
Remark 1. Prop. 1 can be summarized by V := {v ∈
{JB , C} × {JB , JL, C}6 × {JL, C} with no consecutive sub-
sequences of the form (JB , JL) or (JB , ∗, JL)}.
Definition 3 (T & Tv). Let T denote the set of valid
tokenizations. For v ∈ V let Tv ⊂ T be the tokenizations
with byte boundaries defined by v.
Corollary 1. There are |T | = |V | × |Tv| = 577 × 264−8 ≈
4.16E19 valid tokenizations.
Proof. |{JB , C} × {JB , JL, C}6 × {JL, C}| = 22 × 36, and
removing subsequences of the form (JB , JL) or (JB , ∗, JL),
leaves 577. |Tv| = 264−8 as the remaining 64 − 8 bit gaps
have two valid options, cut or join.
2) Optimization Formulation: Step 1 provisions f(i|E(ji))
= P (cut to the right of bit i for endianness E(ji)), with ji =
bi/8c the corresponding byte index for bit i. We set f(i, e) =
∞ if bit i is to the left of a mandatory cut, e.g., the next bit is
a constant bit. For intuition in the formulation below, consider
f(i|E(ji)) not as the likelihood of a cut, but as penalty for
not cutting, and let β be a fixed cut penalty parameter.
The idea for our cost function is to let signals accrue a
join penalty, the sum of the probabilities f(i|E(ji)) for each
bit that is not cut in order to form the signal. Since the
candidate signal entails a cut to the right of its LSB, we swap
f(LSB,E(ji)) for β, the cut penalty. Thus, the β controls
how liberal to be with cuts.
The intuition is to find the optimal balance between parti-
tioning the message into too many signals and joining multiple
disparate signals, by balancing the cut penalty (β) with the
likelihood of a cut (join penalty f ). Setting β = 1 will lead
to only cutting where f(i|·) = ∞ (signals demarcated by
constant bits), and β = 0 will lead to a cut at every gap,
resulting in 64 1-bit signals.
Definition 4 (Costs). Define the Signal Cost as
φ(I, E) :=
∑
i∈I\{LSB}
f(i|E(ji))︸ ︷︷ ︸
join penalty
+ β
︸︷︷︸
cut penalty
.
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Extending to a Tokenization Cost we have
Φ(T ) : =
∑
I∈T
φ(I, E)
=
∑
χT (i)=0
f(i|E(ji)) +
∑
χT (i)=1
β
=
63∑
i=0
(1− χT (i))f(i|E(ji)) + χT (i)β.
with χT (i) = 1 if i is an LSB of a token in T , else 0.
The above definition sets up our optimization problem,
identify the optimal tokenization
T0 := arg min
T∈T
Φ(T ). (2)
Example 3. To give a concrete example of using the cost
function, consider the first two diagrams in Fig. 5 depicting
the big endian probabilities f(·|E = B) (left) and the
little endian probabilities f(·|E = L) (middle). Consider
two overlapping 11-bit candidate signals that both contain
byte 4 (bits 32 to 39 as numbered in the right plot): a big
endian signal I0 = [29, . . . , 31, 32, . . . , 39], and a little endian
signal I1 = [32, . . . , 39, 24, . . . , 26]. The penalties for these
candidate signals are φβ,f (I0, B) = 1.73− .76+β = .97+β,
and φβ,f (I1, L) = 0 + β = β. Since clearly .97 + β > β,
(I1, L) has a lower penalty, in this case, regardless of the
choice of β. In fact, T0 = (I1, L) turns out to be in the globally
optimal T0, which is shown in Fig. 5 (right) in teal.
3) Finding an Optimum: Given a cut penalty β ∈ [0, 1]
and pre-computed cut probabilities—f(i|E(ji)) for all i ∈
{0, . . . , 63} and both endiannesses E(ji) (see Step 1, Sec.
III-A)—our goal is to identify an optimal tokenization (Eq. 2)
from the 4.2E19 valid options.
Theorem 1. Fixing v ∈ V , where v gives cuts/joins at byte
boundaries (bits in S = {8(j + 1)− 1}7j=0), the subproblem:
arg min
T∈Tv
Φβ,f (T )
is realized by T0,v , the tokenization: for all i ∈ [0, 63]\S, bit
i is an LSB (cut to the right of bit i) iff β < (f(i|E(ji)).
Proof. Let T0,v be as above and T ∈ Tv . By definition, for
i /∈ S, T will accrue cost min(f(i|E(ji)), β). Since T, T0,v ∈
Tv both accrue the same cost for bits i ∈ S. It follows that
Φ(T )− Φ(T0,v) =
∑
i/∈S [(1− χT (i))f(i|E(ji)) + χT (i)β −
min(f(i|E(ji)), β)] ≥ 0.
Fig. 5: Probabilities of boundaries according to big endian ordering
(left), little endian ordering (middle). The resulting optimal tokeniza-
tion (right) using β = .6 is three little endian (navy, blue, teal), one
big endian (snot) and a 4-bit (maroon) signal.
This gives a efficient, constant-time search algorithm (689
operations), namely, (1) storing the optimal cut/join choice
for each bit i ∈ [0, 63]\S under each endianness (56 × 2
operations), then (2) applying Thm. 1 to realize both T0,v
and cost Φ(T0,v) for each of 577 v ∈ V and maintaining
the minimum. In the case that there are multiple optimal
tokenizations, we break ties by choosing the one with the
maximum number of cuts, followed by the minimum number
of little endian signals, which necessarily furnishes a unique
optimal solution.
After experimenting with adjusting the tuning parameter β,
we find that β ∈ [.5, .7] yield fairly consistent and correct
tokenizations, and so for our pipeline we choose β = .6. Note
that the heuristic classifiers in Step 1 provide probabilities
in {0, 1} meaning all choices of β yield identical results.
Further, note that with binary inputs, a tie break is scheme
is often necessary, whereas with high precision probability
inputs, multiple optimal tokenizations with the same cost are
virtually impossible.
The outputs of the endianness optimizer described in this
step are tokenized signals. While in theory another endianness
optimizer could be developed and exchanged for this compo-
nent, we consider this custom optimization to be a fixed and
non-interchangeable component of the pipeline.
C. Step 3: Signedness Classification
A signedness classifier takes a tokenized signal (start bit,
length, endianness) and makes a binary decision on whether
each signal of length greater than two is signed (using two’s
complement encoding) or unsigned. To develop our classi-
fier, we followed a similar workflow to Step 1 (Sec. III-A)
experimenting with supervised classifiers, and unsupervised
heuristics. Since each signals is tokenized, and thus the LSBs
and MSBs are now known, this problem is significantly
simpler, and features can be developed per signal rather than
per bit. However, after experimenting with several features
and supervised classification methods, we find that a simple
heuristic based on the the distribution of the two most signifi-
cant bits of the signal yielded better results than the supervised
methods. Using this heuristic, described in Alg. 2, we obtain
almost perfect classification (97.3% F-Score), so ultimately,
we chose to use this heuristic in the CAN-D pipeline rather
than a learned model.
The heuristic is based on how the two most significant
bits will behave if the signal is signed or unsigned. Let
Bi0 , Bi1 denote the MSB and next-most significant bit of the
signal. First, consider the probabilities of the center values,
P [(Bi0 , Bi1) = (1, 0)],P [(Bi0 , Bi1) = (0, 1)]. If a signal
Algorithm 2: Heuristic Signedness Classifier
Inputs: {Bi0(t), Bi1(t)}t, γ
if P [(Bi0 , Bi1) = (1, 0)] + P [(Bi0 , Bi1) = (0, 1)] = 0 then
return True
if P [(Bi0(tj), Bi1(tj)) = (0, 0)∧
(Bi0(tj+1), Bi1(tj+1)) = (1, 1)] = 0 then
return False
if P [(Bi0 , Bi1) = (1, 0)] + P [(Bi0 , Bi1) = (0, 1)] < γ then
return True
return False
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is signed, for values close to zero (Bi0 , Bi1) will be (0, 0)
(small positives) or (1, 1) (small negatives), whereas values
near extremes will be (1, 0) (near min) or (0, 1) (near max).
A signal with a small probability of these values is therefore
likely signed. Second, consider the probability of a jump
between extreme values, P [(Bi0(tj), Bi1(tj)) = (0, 0) ∧
(Bi0(tj+1), Bi1(tj+1)) = (1, 1)]. If a signal is signed, when
changing from small positive to small negative values, the
two MSBs must flip from (0, 0) to (1, 1). However, if it is
unsigned, this is unlikely to ever happen since this would entail
flipping from a very small value to a large one resulting in a
significant discontinuity. If this probability is 0, the signal is
likely unsigned. We apply these two ideas as described in Alg.
2, where we set γ = .2 based on observations of data.
After step 3, signedness classification, each ID’s 64-bit
message is partitioned into signals, for which we know their
start bits, lengths, endianness, and signedness; consequently,
each signal can now be translated into a timeseries of integers,
denoted s(t). No previous works have attempted signedness
classification, so the signedness classifier presented in this
section currently sole option for this modular component.
D. Step 4: Physical Interpretation
For our signal-to-timeseries matcher, we follow Verma et
al.’s ACTT [6] to match a subset of the translated signals
with diagnostic data. This augments matched signals with the
the necessary information to interpret them as actual measure-
ments in the vehicles. We do this by comparing each signal
time series, s(t), to each DID trace D(t′), and determining if
they are linearly related. Because the DID traces are sampled at
a lower rate than normal CAN traffic, we interpolate the signal
values over the diagnostic timepoints, obtaining s(t′). We then
regress D(t′) onto s(t′) and find the best linear fit, furnishing
the coefficients a, b so that s¯(t) := as(t′) + b ≈ D(t′). To
score the model’s fit, we use coefficient of determination, R2,
which measures the fraction of total variation in time series
D(t′) that is explained by s¯(t′); thus, R2 = 1 exhibits a perfect
fit, while R2 = 0 exhibits the fit of a horizontal line (assuming
D(t) is not the horizontal line). For each signal s, we find the
diagnostic D that yields the highest R2 value. If R2 > δ,
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is a tuning threshold, s is matched to D. A
δ = 1 will return only perfectly correlated signals, while a
small δ will allow for less correlated signals to be matched.
For our implementation, we choose δ = .5.
For signals that match a diagnostic, we have interpretation,
having procured the label and units, as well as the scale,
a, and offset, b. In additional to ACTT [6], LibreCAN [7]
(Phase 2) propose a signal-to-timeseries matching algorithms
that could be used interchangeably (or even combined) for
this component. Finally, note that translated signals that are
not augmented with labels through this physical interpretation
step are still highly valuable, as there are many applications
in which these unlabeled translated timeseries are far more
useful than binary data.
IV. DATASET
As our goal is to build a vehicle-agnostic signal-extraction
capability, we have collected CAN data from ten different
TABLE IV: Statistics on ten CAN logs, each collected from a vehicle
of a different make. For each log, we enumerate: non-constant IDs
(IDs), non-constant IDs defined by CommaAI (Def. IDs), and each of
the encodings of defined signals (big/little endian, signed/unsigned)
resulting from ground-truth labeling process (see Sec. IV). Three logs
contain a high percentage of little endian signals, and all but one
contain signed signals.
Log IDs1 Def. IDs Unsigned, B.E. Signed L.E. Total
#12 54 17 61 3 25 89
#2 66 14 143 21 0 164
#3 35 7 50 18 0 68
#4 79 28 181 0 0 181
#5 63 21 111 5 0 116
#6 22 19 72 2 14 87
#7 26 8 53 3 0 56
#8 40 8 98 10 1 108
#9 27 17 56 7 18 75
#10 55 14 136 21 0 157
1 Non-constant IDs: IDs with more than one non-constant bit
2 Vehicle adheres to J1939 Standard protocol [35], and signal defini-
tions are derived from this open standard.
vehicle makes and years ranging from 2010 to 2017 for
training and evaluation. The details of defined signals for each
log are described in Table IV. This dataset is far larger and
more varied than any previous work. Notably, in order to
test generalizability of the methods, no duplicate makes were
included as different models of the same make (e.g., Toyota
Camry and Corolla) have similar characteristics.
In order to obtain data for our signal reverse engineering
process (bit position, endianness, and signedness), we used
DBCs acquired from two sources. Log #1 is from a vehicle
that uses the J1939 standard [35], a protocol for heavy trucks
that provides signal definitions that are publicly available. We
were therefore able to obtain absolute ground-truth labels for
the signals in this log. Since this log contains every type of
signal (little endian, big endian, signed, unsigned) and we have
absolute confidence in these labels, we consider this log to be
the gold standard for testing.
For logs #2-10, we make use of CommaAI’s OpenDBC
project [36]. This is an open, crowdsourced set of DBCs
that was constructed by individuals using a CommaAI Panda
device (an OBD-II plugin) along with the CommaAI Cabana
interface to hand label the data for their vehicle through trial,
error, and visual inspection. OpenDBC only includes DBCs for
a limited number of vehicles and only a subset of IDs/signals
for vehicle are defined (see difference in IDs and Def. IDs in
Table IV). In particular, unobservable signals are often missing
since these are created based on visual inspection.
We collected data from vehicles that had a closely matching
CommaAI DBC (same manufacturer, similar model/year/trim).
While CommaAI appears to do some measure of quality
assurance on this data, due to the crowd-sourced nature of
the data, we must be mindful of the potential for mislabeled
signals. We performed quality control on this data using the
following process. First, we partition each non-constant ID
trace into sequences of contiguous, non-constant bits and
label each as an unsigned, big endian signal. This provides
a set of “Baseline” signal definitions. Next, we parse the data
according to the DBC, trimming off any signal MSBs that are
constant in our data due to extreme values not being reached
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and redefine the signal to have the trimmed start bit and length.
For IDs defined by CommaAI, we compare the Baseline and
trimmed CommaAI signal definitions. If the definitions for
the ID agree and pass a visual check, we automatically add
them to our ground-truth DBC. If they disagree, we display
the signal tokenization layout and signal time series’ plots side
by side, and identify the discrepancies (see Fig. 6 for exam-
ples of these types of visualizations). If easily resolvable by
experimentation and visual inspection (e.g. adding an obvious
signal definition missing from CommaAI DBC, identifying an
unsigned signal mislabeled as signed, etc.), we add the correct
signal definitions to our DBC with minor errors fixed. If we
are unable to resolve the discrepancy easily, we simply do
not include the ID or signal in our ground-truth DBC. For
IDs that do not appear in the CommaAI DBC, we perform
a similar process of visual inspection of the Baseline plots,
adding these definitions to our ground-truth if easily resolved,
and discarding them if not.
This iterative method is tedious and time consuming, yet this
visual inspection process is quite effective since both legiti-
mate signals and mis-classified encodings (e.g. signed signals
translated incorrectly as unsigned) are usually recognizable
from time series plots. In fact, our visual inspection process
is quite similar to the CommaCabana interface used to create
CommaAI DBCs.
V. EVALUATION
Using the dataset described in Sec. IV, we compare our
algorithms, both with the Heuristic1 and Machine Learning
(ML)2 for Step 1, against the following predecessors: TANG
[4]3, READ [5], ACTT [6]3,4, LibreCAN (Phase 0) [7]5. See
Sec. II for a description of each algorithm. Note that we do
not test the algorithm proposed by Markowitz & Wool [2]
because it was tested by READ, and shown to produce far
inferior results. We also test against a ‘Baseline’ method that
simply uses constant bits as signal boundaries and assumes big
endian, unsigned encodings. This represents accuracy scores
obtained by simply identifying the obvious boundaries.
We quantitatively compare tokenization and translation
(Step 1-3) efforts of each of these methods in the following
section, Sec. V-A. We note that READ and LibreCAN make
efforts to categorize signals, which is an added benefit of these
methods over ours, but we do not evaluate the efficacy of their
categorization algorithms. We also do not quantitatively evalu-
ate the interpretation (Step 4) efforts by ACTT, LibreCAN, or
CAN-D because, as pointed out by Pese´ et. al [7], ground-truth
interpretations are highly subjective and difficult to evaluate
1α1 = .01, α2 = .5, β = .6 (though irrelevant with binary Step 2
inputs),γ = .2, δ = .4
2Step 1 with tuned RF Model found in Sec. III-A, β = .6, γ = .2, δ = .4
3TANG and ACTT incorrectly considered reverse bit ordering. We only
consider forward bit ordering for these two methods.
4For the R2 threshold, we used 0.4. For the 5/10 logs tested that contained
no diagnostic packets, this method is equivalent to Baseline.
5 The authors state that the optimal choice for parameter Tp0,2 (percent
decrease of bit flip rates) was between .01 and .02 depending on the vehicle.
The authors likely meant between .1 and .2, because a threshold of 1% or
2% would lead to (and we verified this) a very high false positive rate. For
the results reported, Tp0,2 = .2 was used, resulting in much higher F-scores.
quantitatively. Instead, we offer a qualitative comparison of
the full decoding efforts in Sec. V-C, and Fig. 6, which
includes the supplemental interpretations given by CAN-D.
Note that ACTT’s interpretation is virtually identical to CAN-
D’s and LibreCAN’s requires an extra tool to obtain body-
related labeled timeseries, so we did not attempt to perform
their interpretation method.
A. Signal Boundary Classification Evaluation
We first quantitatively evaluate the signal boundary classi-
fication algorithms of each method using three test sets that
differ in the number of positive labels (detailed in Table V).
The condensed (c) set uses all positive labels
(boundaries) in condensed traces (constant bits removed),
thus increasing the number of non-obvious positive
labels and decreasing class bias, resulting in the most
robust evaluation set for testing and comparing the
efficacy of signal boundary classification algorithms.
TABLE V: Positive
labels in each test
set, 5784 negative la-
bels in all sets
n %
c 834 13
f− 208 3
f+ 1159 17
However, “full” non-condensed traces
give a more accurate representation of
the distribution of labels and the most re-
alistic positive samples. In the full (f+)
set, all non-constant samples are scored
(including obvious examples of LSBs
abutting constant bits/message ends).
This f+ set is the most representative
and will yield the most realistic metrics for the total signals
that could be extracted using a given method. Finally, in the
full non-obvious set (f−), only non-obvious examples (those
not abutting constant bits) are scored. This test set has very
few positive labels (3%), but unlike (c), all are boundaries that
delimit two adjacent signals in actual data, and unlike (f+),
will not result in score inflation from obvious boundaries not
attributable to the algorithm being scored. The f− set gives a
balance of realism in use without the inflation of metrics from
the obvious boundaries.
The classification F1-Score, Precision, and Recall for the
under each scenario is reported in Table VI (Top). Recall that
since little endian signals are split on the byte boundary into
two big endian signals for labeling, we are testing solely the
efficacy of the signal boundary classification methods without
taking endianness into account, and thus not penalizing other
algorithms for the limiting assumption of big endianness. Also
note that since CAN-D is supervised, reported metrics are from
aggregating results from LOOCV per log.
B. Signal Error Evaluation
Second, we compare the full tokenization and translation
efforts of each method, computing the `1 error between the
translated signals and their corresponding ground-truth signals.
See results in Table VI. The motivation for this evaluation is
that ultimately, the goal of all of these methods is to extract
time series that can be used as actual real-time measurements
from systems in the car. Therefore, the most important metric
for measuring the efficacy of these methods is not how many
bits overlap or the number of boundaries correctly classified
(as described above), but the difference between the values of
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the extracted signal’s time series and the true signal’s time
series. All previous methods assume big endian, unsigned
signals; consequently, once signal boundaries are assigned, the
translated signal values are completely determined, and this is
what is used for this second evaluation. For CAN-D, Steps 2-3
(endianness optimization & signedness classification) provide
the remaining tokenization and translation information.
We compute the score for each log as follows. Let S denote
the set of normalized true signals, Sˆ the set of normalized
predicted signals (all taking values in [0,1]) for a CAN log. Let
η : S → Sˆ so that for each true signal, s, η(s) is the predicted
signal that contains the MSB of s. Any predicted signals that
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c 0.0 67.1 * 71.1 78.7 91.6 93.5
f− 0.0 45.6 14.5 63.2 70.6 89.6 91.2
f+ 90.1 84.9 89.6 94.4 94.2 98.1 98.4
P
c 0.0 62.6 * 94.8 86.8 97.2 96.4
f− 0.0 31.8 35.2 80.6 64.2 89.9 87.6
f+ 100.0 75.7 96.5 97.6 92.4 98.2 97.6
R
c 0.0 72.4 * 56.8 71.9 86.7 90.8
f− 0.0 80.3 9.1 51.9 78.4 89.4 95.2
f+ 82.0 96.5 83.7 91.4 96.1 98.1 99.1
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#1 18.9 30.0 18.9 20.9 25.4 4.0 3.9
#2 11.2 16.3 12.7 9.7 11.1 0.7 1.9
#3 20.9 25.6 20.9 19.8 20.5 1.3 2.1
#4 4.4 13.8 6.4 2.3 3.5 1.3 1.7
#5 11.9 8.9 11.9 8.8 3.7 3.3 2.3
#6 11.0 18.4 11.0 10.6 9.7 4.9 3.4
#7 6.1 16.4 7.9 5.5 7.6 0.0 0.0
#8 9.4 16.7 9.4 7.9 10.2 0.2 1.5
#9 11.1 14.2 10.6 12.0 12.8 1.5 1.2
#10 9.8 14.1 11.3 7.9 9.9 0.7 0.9
Average 11.5 17.4 11.9 10.5 11.4 1.8 1.9
TABLE VI: Top: Comparison of signal boundary classification results
presented. F = F-score, P = Precision, R = Recall. We test each
method using the three test scenarios, denoted in the third column
and described in Sec. V-A. “Baseline” identifies only obvious signal
boundaries only at constant bits, which trivially has perfect precision.
CAN-D ML achieves the highest F-Score and Recall, while the
Heuristic exhibits the best Precision for all sets. Both exhibit over
∼10% improvement in Recall over all previous methods in the two
difficult test sets (c, f−). We do not evaluate ACTT under scenario
(c) since it relies heavily on constant bits to shrink the search space.
Bottom: Mean `1 error of translated signal values (Eq. 3) reported
for each CAN log, #1-#10 (described in Table IV). CAN-D has
lowest error on every log (often by far) exhibiting more than 5 times
lower error on average, and almost 5 times times lower error on the
“gold-standard” log #1. Averaged across all CAN logs, CAN-D is the
only algorithm to substantially beat the Baseline, achieving perfect
translation in log #7. The most substantial decrease in error is on
logs that have a high percentage of little endian (e.g., #1, #9) or
signed (e.g., #2, #3) signals, demonstrating the efficacy of Step 2 and
3. Even on #4, the lone log without little endian or signed signals,
CAN-D exhibits at least ∼ 50% decrease in error from other methods.
Finally, note that while CAN-D ML has slightly higher average error
than CAN-D Heuristic (due mostly to worse Precision in Step 1),
it has lower error for all logs containing little endian signals (#1,
#6, #9), perhaps illustrating that the endianness optimization (Step 2)
benefits from the probability inputs offered by the ML in Step 1.
are left unmatched (∀sˆ ∈ Sˆ\η(S)) are paired with the the
zero vector ~0. Take the normalized `1 difference between each
signal pair, resulting in a signal error between 0 and 1. The
mean signal error for the log is defined as∑
s∈S
‖s− η(s)‖1 +
∑
sˆ∈Sˆ\η(S)
‖sˆ‖1 (3)
where ‖s‖1 :=
∑nid
t=1 |s(t)|/nid.
C. Qualitative Results
Fig. 6 depicts three examples of messages decoded by
CAN-D (identical decodings for the ML and heuristic signal
boundary classification) and by the most accurate competing
methods (READ and LibreCAN which both produce the
same signal boundary predictions for these examples) with
detailed descriptions and discussion. These examples illustrate
a message with: signed and unsigned signals (top), little endian
unsigned signals (bottom left) and little endian (signed and
unsigned) signals (bottom right). CAN-D correctly tokenizes
and translates all examples and overall furnishing interpretable
timeseries. Where available, CAN-D’s physical interpretation
(Step 4, Sec. III-D) is provided in annotations above signals,
showing R2 value to gauge goodness-of-match. Overall, mis-
tokenization and mis-translation by other methods result in
rampant discontinuities and dramatic error in most timeseries,
exhibiting the necessity of correctly identifying each signal’s
endianness and signedness.
VI. PROTOTYPE OBD-II PLUGIN
Fig. 7: Prototype CAN-D device
using a Rasberry Pi and CANBerry
Dual 2.1 boards
The CAN-D Prototype
Device is a vehicle-
agnostic, OBD-II (on-
board diagnostic) plugin
that collects CAN data
from the vehicle and
runs the entire CAN-D
Pipeline depicted in 1. The
prototype (shown in Fig. 7)
is built using Linux-based,
single-board computers. Specifically, we use a Raspberry Pi
3B+ with Raspbian Buster in conjunction with a Industrial
Berry’s CANBerry Dual 2.1 [37]. The Raspberry Pi 3B+
offers 1GB of RAM and a 1.4GHz ARMv8 processor. The
device is powered either from battery or using on-board
power from a vehicle’s 12-volt system.
One challenge of building a vehicle-agnostic prototype is
that the bitrate for the CAN is unknown and variable per
vehicle, and improper bitrate selection can cause adverse
vehicle function. In order to solve this issue, the device iterates
through common bitrates, identifying the bitrate that results
in only expected packets. This allows our prototype to be
compatible with most CANs regardless of bitrate.
Another complication is that automobiles typically have
multiple CAN buses, and often more than one is available
from the OBD-II interface. The prototype analyzes two unique
networks by allocating a dedicated CAN controller for each
using CANBerry Dual 2.1. Once connected, it automatically
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Fig. 6: Tokenization & translation of three messages by CAN-D and top competing methods, READ & LibreCAN. When interpretation is
provided by CAN-D, the label and units of the matched diagnostic is shown with the R2 value, and the values are scaled appropriately.
(a) Message containing signed and unsigned engine- and pedal-related signals. Left: Signal boundaries and endianness are correctly identified
by all methods. Middle: All signals are correctly translated and have physical interpretations by CAN-D. Highly correlated matches found for
green, blue and maroon signals. The navy signal at bit 4, matched to DID ‘Accelerator pedal position D’ with low correlation (R2 = .53),
is likely an accelerator indicator. As this is not an available DID, CAN-D has unearthed information that could not be simply queried.Right:
Other methods incorrectly translate green and blue signals as unsigned, resulting in sharp discontinuities where the signals change sign.
(b) Message containing four wheelspeeds encoded as little endian
signals. Top: Correct tokenization & translation by CAN-D and
match to “Vehicle Speed” DID with R2 = 1. Bottom: Mis-tokenized
as five big endian signals by other methods with MSBs (bits 13-
15, 29-31, and 45-47) attributed to the wrong signals. Since all
encode speed, blue, green and orange signals appears correct, save
some minor discontinuities. However, these signals encode the wheel
speeds and are often used by Electronic Stability Control to stimulate
anti-lock braking and traction control pending discrepancies in wheel
speeds; hence, mixing the MSBs of wheel speeds may go unnoticed
in normal conditions but prove consequential in adverse driving
conditions!
(c) Message containing four steering-related, little endian signals,
three of which are signed. Top: Correct tokenization & translation
by CAN-D (no interpretation). Bottom: Incorrect tokenization &
translation by other methods. Assuming big endian signals, they are
are forced to cut on most byte boundaries, resulting in truncated,
noisy teal, snot, orange, and maroon signals. The navy signal does
not appear noisy, but is noticeably incorrect when comparing the
scale and the values for t ∈ [0, 50] to the correct CAN-D translation.
The two MSBs are misattributed to the next signal, resulting in errors
of at least 28 when the MSB(s) are nonzero.
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determines each network bitrate, identifies the VIN using the
UDS query-response protocol (see Sec. I), and begins logging
data. A switch on the prototype can be used to augment the
network traffic with the other available diagnostic queries.
The CAN traffic is collected using SocketCAN can-utils [38],
logged to an ASCII-encoded text CAN log file, and named
using the VIN (automatically identified via a DID query)
and timestamp. Flashing LEDs on the device indicate the
progress throughout this collection process. The device then
runs this CAN log through the CAN-D pipeline, outputting
a DBC which can then be used for real-time decoding and
visualization of signals on the device.
Using our heuristic signal boundary classifier (Step 1),
we benchmark the device running the CAN-D pipeline. We
collected CAN traffic augmented with diagnostic data from
a passenger vehicle for 70s, logging ∼170K frames. Running
the pipeline on this log averaged 129s—55s for preprocessing,
14s for tokenization & translation (Steps 1-3), 50s for inter-
pretation (Step 4), and 10s for writing to DBC, over 6 runs
with negligible variance. As implementation was focused on
algorithmic research, efficiency was not a main goal and could
be significantly improved. This proves the pipeline is viable
for use in a portable, lightweight, edge computing device.
VII. CONCLUSION
We consider the problem of developing a vehicle-agnostic
method for extracting the hidden signals in automotive CAN
data, and present a comprehensive survey of this area. We
present CAN-D, a four-step, modular, pipeline using a com-
bination of machine learning, a novel optimization process,
and heuristics, to identify and correctly translate signals in
CAN data to their numerical timeseries. In particular, CAN-
D is designed to extract big and little endian signals as well
as signed and unsigned signals. While this greatly enhances
the complexity of the problem, these are necessary accom-
modations as specified by standard signal definitions. As our
results exhibit, when endianness and signedness are ignored,
the resulting translations are incorrect and overly noisy. In
evaluation on ten diverse vehicles’ data, we compare CAN-D
to the four state-of-the-art methods, providing a comparative
study of previous methods on a more comprehensive dataset
than ever previously used. We achieve less than 20% of the
average error of other methods and establish that CAN-D is
the lone method that can handle any standard CAN signal.
Finally, we present a lightweight hardware implementation for
using CAN-D in-situ via an OBD-II connection to first learn a
vehicle’s signals, and in future drives convert raw CAN data to
multivariate timeseries in real time. As CAN signals provide
a rich source of real-time data that is currently unrealized, we
hope this contribution will facilitate many vehicle technology
developments.
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